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Recessions often coincide with intensiﬁed restructuring. The conventional Schumpeterian
view argues that recessions promote allocative eﬃciency by driving out less productive ﬁrms and
freeing resources for more productive uses. This paper proposes that the conventional cleansing
eﬀect is oﬀset by a scarring eﬀect. Recessions impede the development of potentially superior
ﬁrms, which might put innovations to better uses, but which are destroyed during their infancy,
and never realize their potential. A model of industry dynamics that combines Schumpeterian
creative destruction with ﬁrm learning is developed to capture both the cleansing and scarring
eﬀects. Calibrating the model with data from the U.S. manufacturing sector demonstrates that
the scarring eﬀect is likely to dominate the cleansing eﬀect, and accounts for the procyclicality
of average labor productivity, a phenomenon at odds with conventional cleansing models.
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1“[Depressions] are the means to reconstruct each time the economic system on a more
eﬃcient plan. But they inﬂict losses while they last, drive ﬁrms into the bankruptcy
court...before the ground is clear and the way paved for new achievement...” Joseph A.
Schumpeter (1934, p. 8)
“You must empty-out the bathing-tub, but not the baby along with it.” Thomas Carlyle
(1904, p. 368)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
With ﬁrms going bankrupt and workers getting laid oﬀ, recessions often coincide with intensiﬁed
restructuring. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) document sharp spikes in employment loss in major
sectors of the economy during postwar U.S. recessions that largely reﬂects deaths of businesses.1
Schumpeter (1934) recognized these patterns decades earlier and proposed the concept of “cleans-
ing": recessions are times when outdated techniques and products are driven out, and resources
are freed for more productive uses; hence, notwithstanding the losses to particular businesses and
individuals, recessions lead to greater allocative eﬃciency. This view has been revived recently by
Hall (1992, 2000), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996), and
Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001).2
However, as pointed out in Caballero and Hammour (1994), the cleansing eﬀect alone contra-
dicts empirical evidence in one important aspect – cleansing implies countercyclical productivity,
while average labor productivity is in fact procyclical. Caballero and Hammour (1994, p.1365) fur-
ther conjecture that the cleansing eﬀect on productivity “is likely to be small and may be dwarfed
by other factors”. Subsequent theoretical work has supplemented the cleansing view from the cre-
ation side. Barlevy (2002) models on-the-job search and argues that during recessions, due to fewer
vacancies, workers are having a more diﬃcult time moving into jobs for which they are best suited.
Thus, he suggests a “sullying eﬀect" on the creation side playing against the cleansing eﬀect on
the destruction side. Although the existing evidence indicates that job destruction is more respon-
sive to business cycles than job creation,3 the question remains, “Are the production units cleared
1The evidence is based on data that extend through 1993. Caballero and Hammour (2004) argue that recessions
reduce rather than increase restructuring, but only cumulatively. In other words, they do not argue against that job
destruction increases during recessions, but rather notice that often sluggish job creation follows. An extension of
the current paper that can generate predictions consistent with their ﬁndings is discussed in the conclusion.
2These authors do not imply recessions lead to higher welfare. Higher allocation eﬃciency and lower welfare
eﬃciency may co-exist during recessions.
3According to Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), job destruction is more volatile than job creation in manufacturing
sectors of many economies. The variance of destruction divided by the variance of creation is 2.04 for the U.S., 1.49
for Canada, 1.0 for Denmark, 2.68 for the Netherlands, 1.69 for Germany, 0.68 in Colombia, and 18.19 for the U.K..
2by recessions necessarily the least productive?” If not, then recessions might exacerbate allocative
ineﬃciency instead of alleviating it as the conventional cleansing view suggests.4
This paper proposes that, in addition to cleansing, recessions have a “scarring eﬀect”. The
f o c u si so nt h ed e s t r u c t i o no fy o u n gﬁrms. We argue that while recessions drive out some of the
least productive ﬁrms, they also kill oﬀ “potentially good ﬁrms”: those that have the potential
to be proven eﬃcient in the future exit during recessions due to reduced proﬁtability. The loss
of potentially good ﬁrms leaves “scars” when a recession arrives, and the “scars” deepen as the
recession persists. The presence of the scarring eﬀect challenges the conventional view of recessions
as periods of solely healthy reallocation: the overall impact of recessions on allocative eﬃciency
should depend on the relative magnitude of two competing eﬀects – cleansing and scarring.
To understand the scarring eﬀect, consider a ﬁrm’s life cycle. Often a ﬁrm starts without
knowing itself how good it is. This may come from the unobservable talent of the manager, the
unknown appeal for a product, or the unpredictable proﬁtability of a store location. As the ﬁrm
operates, realized revenue signals its true quality: high revenue suggests that the ﬁrm is more likely
productive and encourages its continuing operation; low revenue suggests otherwise. A ﬁrm learns
more and more as it grows older; once pessimistic enough, it chooses to exit. When a recession
arrives, the proﬁtability declines in general so that the ﬁrm cannot bear to learn as long as during
good times. A potentially good ﬁrm that would have survived during good times, might thus exit
during recessions before it learns. At the industry level, the exit of potentially good ﬁrms reduces
the proportion of good ﬁrms at present times, as well as in the future because fewer potentially good
ﬁrms are left to learn. The reduced proportion of good ﬁrms drives down the average productivity,
which is deﬁned in this paper as a scarring eﬀect.
The above story reﬂects the spirit of ﬁrm learning, advanced theoretically by Jovanovic (1982)
and suggested empirically as an important driving force for ﬁrm turnover. For example, Baldwin
(1995), Balk and Gort (1993), Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005), Jensen, McGuckin and
Stiroh (2000) present evidence showing that, in the US manufacturing sector, ﬁr m si ne a c he n t e r i n g
cohort diﬀer in productivity; as the cohort ages, its average productivity rises but productivity
dispersion declines. These patterns can be well explained by ﬁrm learning as described above,
which motivates this paper to explore the interaction of learning with business cycles.
We combine learning with the vintage model of Caballero and Hammour (1994) to provide a
framework that captures both cleansing and scarring eﬀects. Firm-level productivity is decomposed
into two components — vintage and unobservable idiosyncratic productivity — so that the indus-
4Ramey and Watson (1997) and Caballero and Hammour (2005) have both examined the eﬃciency of job destruc-
tion threshold. But they are motivated by whether the job destruction margin during recessions is socially eﬃcient.
Their cyclical implications on productivity are the same as in the models of the conventional cleansing eﬀect: average
job quality goes up during recessions.
3trial average productivity is determined by the distribution of ﬁrms across both dimensions. In
equilibrium, ﬁrms’ exit ages indicate the oldest vintages in operation, and the number of learning
opportunities available, which in turn, determines the proportion of good ﬁrms. Demand varia-
tions serve as source of economic ﬂuctuations. Lower demand reduces proﬁtability in general so
that ﬁrms’ exit ages become younger. Younger exit ages directs, on the one hand, resources to
younger and more productive vintages, causing a cleansing eﬀect that raises average productivity;
while, on the other hand, they truncate the learning process that directs resources toward good
ﬁrms, creating a scarring eﬀect that pulls down average productivity. Hence, recessions cause two
competing eﬀects — cleansing and scarring. The question then becomes, which eﬀect dominates?
We turn to data on U.S. manufacturing job ﬂows to explore the quantitative implications of the
scarring eﬀect. Our results suggest that, with reasonable calibration, the scarring eﬀect dominates
the cleansing eﬀect in the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1972 to 1993, and can account for the
observed procyclical average labor productivity.
Various studies of the U.S. manufacturing sector have provided wide support for our decom-
position of ﬁrm-level productivity.5 The resulting two eﬀects on resource reallocation — vintage
and learning — have also been advanced empirically as powerful tools to understand the patterns
of industrial dynamics.6 The signiﬁcance of their interactions is noted by Davis and Haltiwanger
(1999), “vintage eﬀects may be obscured by selection eﬀects; vintage and selection eﬀects may also
interact in important ways...” In our model, it is the interaction of these two eﬀects, together with
demand variations, that generates the scarring eﬀect of recessions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. The cleansing and
scarring eﬀects are motivated in Section 3 by analytical comparative static exercises. Section 4
applies the approach of Krusell and Smith (1998) to numerically solve the model with stochastic
demand ﬂuctuations, and studies its quantitative implications for productivity using data on U.S.
manufacturing job ﬂows. We conclude in Section 5 by discussing the model’s extensions that
generate predictions consistent with other authors’ new ﬁndings.
2 A Renovating Industry with Learning
This section describes a learning industry that experiences exogenous technological progress. Firm-
level productivity is modeled to capture the empirical ﬁndings by Baldwin (1995), Balk and Gort
(1993), Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005) that in the U.S. manufacturing sector, each en-
tering cohort appears more productive than incumbents on average, and is itself a heterogeneous
5See Section 2.
6See Caves (1998) for an extensive review of ﬁndings on ﬁrm turnover and industrial dynamics.
4group in productivity.
2.1 Firms
Consider an industry where labor and capital combine in ﬁxed proportions to produce a homogenous
output. Firms that enter at diﬀerent times may coexist. Each age cohort consists of a continuum
of ﬁrms. A ﬁrm hires one worker, so that a job is created when a ﬁrm enters and a job is destroyed
when a ﬁrm exits. Each ﬁrm is characterized by two components:
1. Vintage;
2. idiosyncratic productivity.
A ﬁrm’s vintage is given by an exogenous technological progress {At}
∞
0 that grows at a constant
rate γ>0 so that
At = A0 · (1 + γ)t,
where A0 is a constant. A ﬁrm enters the industry embodied with the leading technology. It becomes
the ﬁrm’s vintage and will aﬀect its production afterward. We assume that, only entrants have
access to the updated technology, incumbents cannot retool. Since technology grows exogenously,
young ﬁrms are always technologically more advanced than old ﬁrms. With a as the ﬁrm age, the
vintage of a ﬁrm of age a in period t is At−a. Apparently:
At−a = A0 · (1 + γ)t−a.
A tt h et i m eo fe n t r y ,aﬁrm is endowed with idiosyncratic productivity θ. Hence, ﬁrms of
the same vintage diﬀer in idiosyncratic productivity. θ can represent the talent of the manager
as in Lucas (1978), or alternatively, the location of the store, the organizational structure of the
production process, or its ﬁtness to the embodied technology.7 The key assumption regarding θ is
that its value, although ﬁxed at the time of entry, is not directly observable.
A ﬁrm of age a and idiosyncratic productivity θ produces output in period t, according to
qt(a,θ)=At−a · xt = A0 · (1 + γ)t−a · xt,( 1 )
where
xt = θ + εt.
7Since a ﬁrm is identical to a job under this set-up, θ can also be interpreted as “match quality.” See Pries (2004).
5The shock εt is an i.i.d. random draw from a ﬁxed distribution that masks the inﬂuence of θ
on output. We set the operating cost of a ﬁrm (including wages) to 1 by normalization, and let Pt
denote the output price in period t. Then the proﬁt generated by a ﬁrm of age a and idiosyncratic
productivity θ in period t is
πt (a,θ)=Pt · A0 · (1 + γ)t−a · (θ + εt) − 1.( 2 )
Both qt(a,θ) and πt (a,θ) are directly observable. Since the ﬁrm knows its vintage, it can infer
the value of xt.T h eﬁrm uses its observations of xt to learn about θ.
2.2 “All-Or-Nothing” Learning
Firms are price takers and proﬁt maximizers. They attempt to resolve the uncertainty about θ
to decide whether to continue or terminate the production. The random component εt represents
transitory factors that are independent of the idiosyncratic productivity θ. Assuming that εt has
mean zero, we have
Et(xt)=Et(θ)+Et(εt)=Et(θ).
Given knowledge of the distribution of εt, a sequence of observations of xt allows the ﬁrm to
learn about its θ. Although a continuum of potential values for θ is more realistic, for simplicity
it is assumed here that there are only two values: θg for a good ﬁrm and θb for a bad ﬁrm.
Furthermore, εt is assumed to be distributed uniformly on [−ω,ω]. Therefore, a good ﬁrm will
have xt each period as a random draw from a uniform distribution over [θg − ω,θg + ω],w h i l et h e
xt of a bad ﬁrm is drawn from an uniform distribution over [θb − ω,θb + w]. Finally, θg, θb and ω
satisfy 0 <θ b − ω<θ g − ω<θ b + ω<θ g + ω.
Pries (2004) shows that the above assumptions give rise to an “all-or-nothing” learning process.
With an observation of xt within (θb + ω,θg + ω],t h eﬁrm learns with certainty that it is a good
idiosyncratic productivity; conversely, an observation of xt within [θb − ω,θg − ω) indicates that it
is a bad idiosyncratic productivity. However, an xt within [θg−ω,θb+ω] does not reveal anything,




This all-or-nothing learning simpliﬁes our model considerably. We let θe represent the expected
θ. Since it is θe instead of θ that aﬀects ﬁrms’ decisions, there are three groups of ﬁrms corresponding
to the three values of θe: ﬁrms with θe = θg, ﬁrms with θe = θb,a n dﬁrms with θe = θu,
the prior mean of θ.W e d e ﬁne “unsure ﬁrms” as those with θe = θu. We further assume that
the unconditional probability of θ = θg is ϕ,a n dl e tp ≡
θg−θb


























Figure 1: Dynamics of a Birth Cohort: the distance between the concave curve and the bottom
axis measures the density of ﬁrms with θe = θg; the distance between the convex curve and the top
axis measures the ﬁrms with θe = θb; the distance between the two curves measures the density of
unsure ﬁrms (ﬁrms with θe = θu).
idiosyncratic productivity being revealed every period. Firms enter the market as unsure; thereafter,
every period they stay unsure with probability 1−p, learn they are good with probability p·ϕ and
learn they are bad with probability p · (1 − ϕ). Thus, the evolution of θe f r o mt h et i m eo fe n t r yi s














If ﬁrms were to live forever, eventually all uncertainty would be resolved because the market
would provide enough information to reveal each ﬁrm’s true idiosyncratic productivity. The limiting
probability distribution as a goes to ∞ is
³
ϕ, 0, (1 − ϕ)
´
.
7Because there is a continuum of ﬁrms, it is assumed that the law of large numbers applies, so
that both ϕ and p are not only the probabilities but also the fractions of unsure ﬁrms with θ = θg,
and of ﬁrms who learn θ each period, respectively. Hence, ignoring ﬁrm exit for now,w eh a v et h e
densities of three groups of ﬁrms in a cohort of age a as
³
ϕ · [1 − (1 − p)




which implies an evolution of cross-section ﬁrm distribution within a birth cohort as shown in
Figure 1, with the horizontal axis depicting the age of a cohort across time. The densities of ﬁrms
that are certain about their idiosyncratic productivity, whether good or bad, grow as a cohort
ages. Moreover, the two “learning curves” (depicting the evolution of densities of good ﬁrms and
bad ﬁrms) are concave. This feature is deﬁned as the decreasing property of marginal learning
in Jovanovic (1982): the marginal learning eﬀect decreases with ﬁrm age, which in our model is
reﬂected by the fact that the marginal number of learners decreases with cohort age. The convenient
feature of all-or-nothing learning is that, on the one hand, it implies that any single ﬁrm learns
“suddenly”, which allows us to easily keep track of the cross-section distribution of beliefs, while
on the other hand, it still implies “gradual learning” at the cohort level.
However, there is more that Figure 1 can tell. If we let the horizontal axis depict the cross-
sectional distribution of ﬁrm ages at any instant, then Figure 4 can be interpreted as the ﬁrm
distribution across ages and idiosyncratic productivity of an industry that features constant entry
but no exit. In this industry, cohorts continuously enter in the same size and experience the same
dynamics afterward, so that at any one time, diﬀerent life-stages of diﬀerent birth cohorts overlap,
giving rise to the distribution in Figure 4. Under this interpretation, Figure 4 indicates that at any
instant older cohorts contain fewer unsure ﬁrms, because they have lived longer and learned more.
2.3 The Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The following sequence of events is assumed to occur within a period. First, entry and exit occur
after ﬁrms observe the aggregate state. Second, each surviving ﬁrm pays a ﬁxed operating cost to
produce. Third, the aggregate price is realized. Fourth, ﬁrms observe revenue and update beliefs.
Then, another period begins.
With this setup, this subsection considers a recursive competitive equilibrium deﬁnition which
includes as a key component the law of motion of the aggregate state of the industry. The aggregate
state is (F,D). F denotes the distribution (measure) of ﬁrms across vintages and idiosyncratic
productivity. The part of F that measures the number of ﬁrms with belief θe and age a is denoted
f (θe,a). D is an exogenous demand parameter; it captures aggregate conditions and is fully
8observable. The law of motion for D is exogenous, described by D’s transition matrix. The law of
motion for F is denoted H so that F0 = H(F,D). The sequence of events implies that H captures
the inﬂuence of entry, exit and learning.
Three assumptions characterize the equilibrium: ﬁrm rationality, free entry and competitive
pricing.
Firm Rationality: ﬁrms are assumed to have rational expectations; their decisions are forward-
looking. Firms need to observe (F,D) to predict the sequence of prices from today onward. There-
fore, the relevant state variables for a ﬁrm are its vintage, its belief about its true idiosyncratic
productivity, and the aggregate state (F,D).W e l e t V (θe,a;F,D) be the expected value, for a
ﬁrm with belief θe and age a, of staying in operation for one more period and optimizing afterward,












F0 = H (F,D)
and the exogenous laws of motion for D and θe ( driven by all-or-nothing learning).
Since ﬁrms enter as unsure, ﬁrm rationality implies that entry occurs if and only if V (θu,0;F,D) >
0.M e a n w h i l e ,aﬁrm with belief θe and age a exits if and only if V (θe,a;F,D) < 0.
Free entry:n e wﬁrms are free to enter at any instant, each bearing an entry cost c. The entry
cost can be interpreted as the cost of establishing a particular location or the cost of ﬁnding a
manager. Assuming f (θu,0;F,D) represents the size of the entering cohort when the aggregate
state is (F,D), and letting c represent the entry cost, we have
c = C (f (θu,0;F,D)),c>0 and C0 ≥ 0.( 4 )
I let the entry cost depend positively on the entry size to capture the idea that, for the industry
as a whole, fast entry is costly and adjustment may not take place instantaneously. This can arise
from a limited amount of land available to build production sites or an upward-sloping supply curve
for the industry’s capital stock.8 The free entry condition equates a ﬁrm’s entry cost to its value
of entry, and can be written as
V (θu,0;F,D)=C (f (θu,0;F,D)).( 5 )
As more new ﬁrms enter, the entry cost is driven up until it reaches the value of entry. At this
8See the next section for further discussion.
9point, entry stops.





Q represents aggregate output; it equals the the sum of production over heterogeneous ﬁrms. Given









(1 + γ)−a · θe · f0 (θe,a),( 7 )
where A represents the industry leading technology when the aggregate state is (F,D). f0 (θe,a)
measures the number of operating ﬁrms with θe and a after entry and exit. f0 (θe,a) belongs to F0,
the updated ﬁrm distribution. Since F0 = H(F,D), Q is a function of (F,D).
(6) implies that high output drives down the price. (7) implies that Q depends not only on
the number of ﬁrms in operation, but also on their distribution. More ﬁrms yield higher output
and drive down the price; the more the distribution is skewed toward younger vintages and better
idiosyncratic productivity, the higher the output and the lower the price.
With the above three conditions, we have the following:
Deﬁnition: A recursive competitive equilibrium is a law of motion H, a value function
V , and a pricing function P such that (i) V solves the ﬁrm’s problem; (ii) P satisﬁes
(6) and (7); and (iii) H is generated by the decision rules suggested by V and the
appropriate summing-up of entry, exit and learning.
An additional assumption is made to simplify the model:
Assumption: Given values for other parameters, the value of θb is so low that V (θb,a;F,D)
is negative for any (F,D) and a.
This assumption implies that bad ﬁrms always exit, so that at any one time, there are only two
types of ﬁrms in operation — unsure and good.
9Q is the sum of realized output rather than expected output, since the contribution to aggregate output by each
ﬁrm depends on its true type θ rather than θ
e. However, with a continuum of ﬁrms, the law of large numbers implies
that the random noises and the expectation errors cancel out in each cohort, so that the sum of realized output equals
the sum of expected output.
103 Cleansing and Scarring
This section motivates the cleansing and scarring eﬀects. The previous section shows that the
ﬁrm distribution F enters the model as a state variable, which makes it diﬃcult to characterize
the dynamics generated by demand ﬂuctuations. However, similar studies ﬁnd that the eﬀects
of temporary changes in aggregate conditions are qualitatively similar to the eﬀects of permanent
changes.10 Therefore, we exercise in this section comparative statics on the steady-state equilibrium.
The comparative static exercises capture the essence of industry dynamics as well as how demand
can aﬀect the labor allocation, and thus provide a more rigorous intuition for the scarring and
cleansing eﬀects described in the introduction. In the next section, we will turn to a numerical
analysis of the model’s response to stochastic demand ﬂuctuations and conﬁrm that the results
from the comparative static exercises carry over.
3.1 The Steady State
Id e ﬁne a steady state as a recursive competitive equilibrium with time-invariant aggregate states.11
It satisﬁes two additional conditions: D is and is perceived as time-invariant: D0 = D; F is time-
invariant: F0 = H (F,D).S i n c e H is generated by entry, exit and learning, a steady state must
feature time-invariant entry and exit for F = H (F,D) to hold. Thus, it can be summarized
by {f(0),ag,au},w i t hf (0) as the entry size, ag as the maximum age for good ﬁrms, and au as
the maximum age for unsure ﬁrms. The next proposition establishes the existence of a unique
steady-state equilibrium. The proof is presented in the appendix.
Proposition 1: With D constant over time, there exists a unique time-invariant {f(0),ag,au}
that satisﬁes the conditions of ﬁrm rationality, free entry and competitive pricing.
The steady-state labor distribution and job ﬂows are illustrated in Figure 2. Like Figure 1,
there are two ways to interpret Figure 2. First, it displays the steady-state life-cycle dynamics
of a representative cohort with the horizontal axis depicting the cohort age across time.F i r m s
enter in size f (0) as unsure. As the cohort ages and learns, bad ﬁrms are thrown out so that the
cohort size declines; good ﬁrms are realized, so that the density of good ﬁrms increases. After age
au, all unsure ﬁrms exit because their vintage is too old to survive with θe = θu.H o w e v e r ,ﬁrms
with θe = θg stay. Afterwards, the cohort contains only good ﬁrms and the number of good ﬁrms
remains constant because learning has stopped. Good ﬁrms live until ag. The vintage after ag is
too old even for good ﬁrms to survive.
10See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Caballero and Hammour (1994 and 1996), and Barlevy (2002).
11The term “steady state” follows Caballero and Hammour (1994). Despite its name, the steady-state price
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Figure 2: The Steady-state Labor Distribution and Job Flows: the distance between the lower
curve (extended as the horizontal line) and the bottom axis measures the density of good ﬁrms;
the distance between the two curves measures the density of unsure ﬁrms.
12Second, Figure 2 also displays the ﬁrm distribution across ages and idiosyncratic productivity
at any one time, with the horizontal axis depicting the cohort age cross section. At the steady
state, ﬁrms of diﬀerent ages coexist. Since older cohorts have lived longer and learned more, their
size is lower and their density of good ﬁrms is higher. Cohorts older than au are of the same size
and contain only good ﬁrms. No cohort is older than ag.
Notice that, despite its time-invariant structure, the industry experiences continuous entry and
exit. With entry, jobs are created; with exit, jobs are destroyed. From a pure accounting point
of view, there are three margins for job ﬂows: the entry margin, the exit margins of good ﬁrms
and unsure ﬁrms, and the learning margin. At the entry margin, new vintages enter. At the exit
margins, old vintages leave. At the learning margin, bad ﬁrms are selected out. Because of creative
destruction, average labor productivity grows at the technological pace γ. Because of learning, the
productivity distribution among older cohorts is more skewed toward good ﬁrms. For cohorts older
than au, labor is employed only at good ﬁrms.
3.2 Comparative Statics: Cleansing and Scarring
In this subsection, we establish that across steady states corresponding to diﬀerent demand levels,
the model delivers the conventional cleansing eﬀect promoted in the previous literature, as well as
an additional scarring eﬀect. The two eﬀects are formalized in Propositions 2 and 3. The intuitions
are captured in Figure 3, which displays the steady-state industry structures corresponding to a
high demand and a low demand.12
Proposition 2: In a steady-state equilibrium, the exit age for ﬁr m sw i t hag i v e nb e l i e fi s
weakly increasing in the demand level and the job destruction rate is weakly decreasing
in the demand level.
A detailed proof is included in the appendix. Proposition 2 argues that the steady state with a
lower demand features younger exit ages. This is shown in Figure 3 as the leftward shift of the two
exit margins corresponding to a lower demand level. Moreover, the steady-state job destruction
12The entry sizes of the two steady states, although diﬀerent, are normalized as 1. Since the steady state features
time-invariant entry and all cohorts are the same size, entry size matters only as a scale.
13rate, denoted jdss, equals the following:13
jdss =
1
au · ϕ +[
1−ϕ
p +( ag − au) · ϕ] · [1 − (1 − p)au+1]
. (8)
I prove in the appendix that
d(jdss)
d(D) ≤ 0. Put intuitively, a high-demand steady state allows
both unsure ﬁrms and good ﬁrms to live longer, so that fewer jobs are destroyed at the exit margins.
In other words, lower demand tends to drive down the price so that some ﬁrms that are viable in
a high-demand steady state are not viable when demand is low.
If this story carries over when D ﬂuctuates stochastically over time, then our model delivers a
conventional “cleansing” eﬀect, in which average ﬁrm age falls during recessions so that recessions
direct resources to younger, more productive vintages. However, once learning is allowed, we also
need to take into account the allocation of labor across idiosyncratic productivity. With only two
true idiosyncratic productivity, good and bad, the idiosyncratic productivity distribution of labor
can be summarized by the fraction of labor at good ﬁrms. A higher fraction suggests a more eﬃcient
allocation of labor. The next proposition establishes how the level of demand aﬀe c t st h i sr a t i oi n
a steady state.
Proposition 3: In a steady state equilibrium, the fraction of labor at good ﬁr m si sw e a k l y
increasing in the demand level.
It can be shown that the steady-state fraction of labor at good ﬁrms, denoted lss





1−(1−p)au +( 1− ϕ)+pϕ(ag − au)
. (9)
In the appendix, we prove that demand aﬀects lss








d(D) .w ea l s op r o v e
d(lss
g )
d(au) ≥ 0, which, together with
d(au)





My analysis suggests that the impact of demand on the fraction of labor at good ﬁrms comes
from its impact on the exit age of unsure ﬁrms. To understand this result intuitively, consider
Figure 3.
13According to Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), for a given population of plants, the job destruction rate in a period
is deﬁned as the total number of jobs lost since the previous period at plants that decreased employment, divided
by the average of total employment in the current and previous periods.With constant total number of jobs, the
steady-state job destruction rate equals the ratio of jobs destroyed at the learning and exit margins over the total
number of jobs. The expression of jd
ss applies not only to a steady state, but also to any industry equilibrium that












Figure 3: Cleansing and Scarring
In Figure 3, because of the cleansing eﬀect, the two exit margins shift to the left corresponding
to a lower demand. The shifted margins clear out old ﬁrms that could be either good or unsure.
However, the leftward shift of the unsure exit margin also reduces the number of older good ﬁrms.
The latter eﬀect, shown as the shaded area in Figure 3, is the scarring eﬀect of recessions.
The scarring eﬀect stems from learning. New entrants begin unsure of their idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, although a proportion ϕ are truly good. Over time, more and more bad ﬁrms leave while
good ﬁrms stay. Since learning takes time, the number of “potentially good ﬁrms” that realize their
true idiosyncratic productivity depends on how many learning chances they have. If ﬁrms could
live forever, eventually all the potentially good ﬁrms would get to realize their true idiosyncratic
productivity. But a ﬁnite life span of unsure ﬁrms implies that if potentially good ﬁrms do not
learn before age au, they exit and thus forever lose the chance to learn. Therefore, au represents
not only the exit age of unsure ﬁrms, but also the number of learning opportunities. A low au
allows potentially good ﬁrms fewer chances to realize their true idiosyncratic productivity, so that
the number of old good ﬁrms in operation after age au is also reduced.
Hence, the industry suﬀers from uncertainty; it tries to select out bad ﬁrms but the group of
ﬁrms it clears at age au includes some ﬁrms that are truly good. The number of clearing mistakes
the industry makes at au depends on the size of the unsure exit margin, which in turn depends
15on the value of au.14 W h e nad r o pi nd e m a n dr e d u c e st h ev a l u eo fau, this reduces the number of
learning opportunities, allows fewer good ﬁrms to become old and thus shifts the labor distribution
toward bad ﬁrms.
To summarize from Propositions 2 and 3, a low-demand steady state features a better average
vintage, yet a less eﬃcient cross-idiosyncratic productivity distribution of labor. If the comparative
static results carry over when demand ﬂuctuates stochastically, then recessions will have both a
conventional cleansing eﬀect, shifting resources to better vintages, and a scarring eﬀect, shifting
resources to bad idiosyncratic productivity. The two eﬀects are directly related to each other: it is
the cleansing eﬀe c tt h a ts i g n i ﬁcantly reduces learning opportunities and hence prevents more ﬁrms
from realizing their potential.
When we move beyond steady states to allow for cyclical ﬂuctuations, the intuition behind
“cleansing and scarring” still carries over. Again, consider Figure 3. Both exit margins shift as
soon as demand drops so that the cleansing eﬀect takes place immediately.15 However, the scarring
eﬀect takes place gradually. When a recession ﬁrst arrives, the group of ﬁrms already in the
shaded area in Figure 3 will not leave despite the shift in exit margins, since they know their true
idiosyncratic productivity to be good. They leave gradually as the recession persists. At this point,
the scarring eﬀect starts to take place: the reduced au allows fewer good ﬁrms to survive past au.
The shaded area would eventually be left blank, and the “scar” left by recessions would surface.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Before we turn to the numerical analysis to characterize the transitional dynamics, we close this sec-
tion with two modiﬁcations of the model to check the robustness of our results from the comparative
static exercises.
First, we allow the entry cost to be independent of entry size. In our model, C is assumed to
depend positively on entry size, so that a lower demand is accommodated by both less entry and
more exit. But the entry margin may exclusively accommodates demand ﬂuctuations. This extreme
case is deﬁned as the “full-insulation” case in Caballero and Hammour (1994). They argue that it
occurs when C0 (f (θu,0)) = 0. The intuition is as follows. If entry cost is independent of entry size,
then fast entry is costless and the adjustment on the entry margin becomes instantaneous. When
demand falls, entry will adjust to such a level that aggregate output falls by the same proportion,
which keeps price at the same level. Then the value of staying remain unaﬀected, and the exit
margins do not respond. The "full-insulation" case when C0 (f (θu,0)) = 0 is also present in our
14The all-or-nothing learning suggests that the number of truly good ﬁrms cleared out at au equals f (0)(1 − p)
au ϕ.
15My numerical exercises imply that when demand falls, these margins initially shift more than suggested by the
comparative static exercises. The margins shift back partially as the recession persists. A detailed discussion of this
phenomenon is contained in Section 4.
16model.16 Hence, with entry cost independent of entry size, there is neither a cleansing eﬀect nor a
scarring eﬀect.
However, in reality, an industry may not be able to create all the necessary production units
instantaneously. Goolsbee (1998) shows empirically that higher investment demand drives up both
the equipment prices and the wage of workers producing the capital goods. His ﬁndings suggest
that as more ﬁrms enter and increase the demand for capital, it becomes increasingly costly to
purchase capital. Therefore, C0 (f (θu,0)) > 0 seems more reasonable. Furthermore, data does
not support the assumption that C0 (f (θu,0)) = 0. In the full-insulation case, job creation fully
accommodates demand ﬂuctuations and job destruction does not respond. This contradicts the
large and robust evidence of highly volatile job destruction across sectors and economies.
Second, we allow the process of learning to be more complicated than “all-or-nothing” to see if
the scarring eﬀect still carries over. To look at the scarring eﬀect from a diﬀerent angle, suppose
we divide ﬁrms into two groups, young and old.17 With lo
g denoting the fraction of labor at good
ﬁrms among the old, l
y
g as the fraction among the young, fy as the density of young ﬁrms and fo



































which is greater than or equal to zero as long as lo
g −l
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g ≥ 0 should hold for any learning process. Hence, the scarring eﬀect of recessions
occurs regardless of the learning process, as long as recessions reduce the ratio of old to young ﬁrms
(
fo
fy) ,w h i c hb yd e ﬁnition will be true in any model in which recessions cleanse the economy of older
vintages. Intuitively, recessions shift resources toward younger ﬁrms, so that there cannot be as
much learning taking place as in booms. Although this analysis is preliminary, we can still argue
that recessions would allow for less ﬁrm learning, so the scarring eﬀect would carry over even with
a more complicated process of learning.18
16It is discussed in the proof for Proposition 2. See the appendix.
17The cut-oﬀ age to deﬁne “young” and “old” is arbitrarily chosen. Changing this cut-oﬀ age does not aﬀect the
analysis that follows.
18To be more speciﬁc, suppose we assume a more complicated learning process with normally distributed random
noise, so that the signals received by good ﬁrms are normally distributed around θg and the signals received by bad
ﬁrms are normally distributed around θb. In that case, a ﬁrm can never know for certain that it is good or bad, and
174 Quantitative Implications with Stochastic Demand Fluctuations
This section applies numerical techniques to analyze a stochastic version of our model in which the
demand level follows a two-state Markov process with values [Dh,D l] and transition probability μ.
Throughout this section, ﬁrms expect the current demand level to persist for the next period with
probability μ, and to change with probability 1 − μ.
The key computational task is to map F,t h eﬁrm distribution across ages and idiosyncratic
productivity, given demand level D, into a set of value functions V (θe,a;F,D). Unfortunately,
the endogenous state variable F is a high-dimensional object. The numerical solution of dynamic
programming problems becomes increasingly diﬃcult as the size of the state space increases. Our
computational strategy follows Krusell and Smith (1998) by shrinking the state space into a limited
set of variables and showing that these variables’ laws of motion can approximate the equilibrium
behavior of ﬁrms in the simulated time series. Details are presented in the appendix.
With approximated laws of motion, we ﬁrst conﬁrm that the basic insights from the comparative
static exercises carry over with probabilistic business cycles. Then we examine whether the scarring
eﬀect is likely to be empirically relevant. Speciﬁcally, we calibrate our model so that its equilibrium
job destruction rate mimics the observed pattern in the data. As we have argued, recessions clear
out old ﬁrms, including some good ﬁrms that have not yet learned their type. Therefore, the model
allows us to use the job destruction rate to make inferences on the size of the cleansing and scarring
eﬀects.
4.1 Calibration
Table 1 presents the assigned parameter values. Some of the parameter values are pre-chosen.
The most signiﬁcant in this group are the relative productivity of good and bad ﬁrms. We follow
Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), who assume a ratio of high-to-low productivity of 2.4 for total factor
productivity and 3.5 for labor productivity based on the between-plant productivity diﬀerentials
reported by Bartelsman and Doms (1997). Since labor is the only input in our model, we normalize
productivity of bad ﬁrms as 1 and set productivity of good ﬁrms as 3.5.W e a l l o w a p e r i o d t o
represent one quarter and set the quarterly discount factor β =0 .99. Next, we need to choose γ,
the quarterly pace of technological progress. In a model with only creative destruction, Caballero
posterior beliefs are distributed continuously between θb and θg. The expected value of staying would still depend
positively on θ
e and negatively on age. Thus, given the aggregate state, there would be a cut-oﬀ age for each belief,
a(θ
e;F,D),s u c ht h a tﬁrms with belief θ
e do not live beyond a(θ
e;F,D).
With a recession, the value of staying across all ages and idiosyncratic productivity falls, so that for each belief
θ
e, the cut-oﬀ age a(θ









 ≥ 0, a fall in
fo
fy drives down the ratio of good ﬁrms and creates the scarring eﬀect.
18parameters (pre-chosen) value
productivity of bad ﬁrms: θb 1
productivity of good ﬁrms: θg 3.5
quarterly technological pace: γ 0.007
quarterly discount factor: β 0.99
parameters (calibrated) value
high demand: Dh 9969.2
low demand: Dl 6973.1
prior probability of being a good ﬁrm: ϕ 0.142
quarterly pace of learning: p 0.08
persistence rate of demand: μ 0.58
entry cost function 0.405 + 0.52 ∗ f(0,θu)
Table 1: Base-line Parameterization of the Model
and Hammour (1994) choose the quarterly technological growth rate as 0.007 by attributing all
output growth of US manufacturing from the second quarter of1972 to the fourth quarter of 1983
to technical progress. To make comparison with their results convenient in the coming subsections,
we also choose γ =0 .007. Caballero and Hammour (1994) estimate the entry cost function by
matching the job creation series of US manufacturing from 1970 to 1989. Their result is applied
here as C =0 .405 + 0.52 ∗ f(0,θu) with f(0,θu) representing the size of entry.
The remaining undetermined parameters are: p, the pace of learning; ϕ, the probability of
being a good ﬁrm; Dh and Dl, the demand levels; μ, the probability with which demand persists;
and c0 and c1, the entry cost parameters. The values of these parameters are chosen so that the
job destruction series in the calibrated model matches properties of the historical series from the
U.S. manufacturing sector. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) shows that the U.S. manufacturing job
destruction rates from the second quarter of 1972 to the fourth quarter of 1993 ﬂuctuates between
2.96% and 11.60% with a mean of 5.6% and a standard deviation of 1.66%. This put the following
restrictions on our calibrated model.
First, its implied long-run job destruction rate must be around 5.6%. Our numerical simula-
tions suggest that the dynamic system eventually settles down with constant entry and exit along
any sample path where the demand level is unchanging. The industry structures at these stable
points are similar to those at the steady states, which allows us to use steady state conditions for
approximation.19 We let ag and au represent the maximum ages of good ﬁrms and unsure ﬁrms
at the high-demand steady state and ag
0 and au
0 represent the exit ages at the low-demand steady
state. The steady-state job destruction rate implied by either pair, has to be around 5.6%.
19However, a stable point is diﬀerent from a steady state. In a steady state, ﬁrms perceive demand as constant,
while in a stable point, ﬁrms perceive demand to persist with probability μ, and to change with probability 1 − μ.
19Second, we match the peak in job destruction that occurs at the onset of a recession. Our model
suggests that the jump in the job destruction rate at the beginning of a recession comes from the
shift of exit margins to younger ages. We assume that when demand drops, the exit margins shift
from ag and au to ag
0 and au
0 immediately, and the job destruction rate at this moment must not
exceed 11.6%.20
Third, we match the trough in job destruction that occurs at the onset of a boom. Our model
suggests that when demand goes up, the exit margins extend to older ages, so that for several
subsequent periods job destruction comes only from the learning margin, implying a trough in the
job destruction rate. To match the data, the job destruction rate at this moment has to be around
3%.
Additionally, (ag,au) and (ag
0,au
0) must satisfy steady state conditions on the gap between the
exit ages of good and unsure ﬁrms. In total, there are six equations to pin down the values of six
parameters.21 Using a search algorithm, we ﬁnd that these conditions are satisﬁed for the following
combination of parameter values: p =0 .08, ϕ =0 .142, ag =7 8 , au =6 4 , ag
0 =7 3 , au
0 =5 9 .B y
applying these ag, au, ag
0 and au
0 to the steady state industry structure, we ﬁnd Dh = 9969.2 and
Dl = 6973.1.
The value of μ is calibrated to match the observed standard deviation of the job destruction
rate of 1.66%. In our model, the job destruction rate jumps above its mean when demand drops
and falls below when demand rises. Thus, the frequency of demand switches between Dh and Dl
determines the frequency with which the job destruction rate ﬂuctuates between 11.6% and 3%,
w h i c hi nt u r na ﬀects the standard deviation of the simulated job destruction series. Our calibration
exercises suggest μ =0 .58.
4.2 Response to a Negative Demand Shock and Simulations of U.S. Manufac-
turing Job Flows
With all of the parameter values assigned, we approximate ﬁrms’ value functions applying the com-
putational strategy that follows Krusell and Smith (1998). With the approximated value functions,
the corresponding decision rules, and an initial ﬁrm distribution, we can investigate the dynamics of
our model’s key variables along any particular path of demand realizations, and study the model’s
quantitative implications.
20As I have noted earlier, the calibration exercises suggest that when a negative aggregate demand shock strikes,
the exit margins shift more than ag
0 and au
0. The bigger shift implies a bigger jump in job destruction, This is why I
require negmax to lie below 11.60%.Ie x p e r i m e n tw i t hd i ﬀerent demand levels to ﬁnd those that generate the closest
ﬁt.
21These equations are availble upon request.
204.2.1 Scarring and Cleansing over the Cycle
To assess the eﬀect of a negative demand shock, we start with a random ﬁrm distribution and
simulate our model with demand level equal to Dh for the ﬁrst 200 quarters. Regardless of the
initial ﬁrm distribution, we ﬁn dt h a tt h ee x i ta g eo fg o o dﬁrms settles down to 76, the exit age
of unsure ﬁrms settles down to 61, the job destruction rate converges to 5.38%, and the fraction
of good ﬁrms converges to 49.8%. This suggests that our model is globally stable. Once the key
variables converge, we simulate the eﬀects of a negative demand shock that persists for the next 87
quarters.
The dynamics of the job destruction rate and the job creation rate are illustrated in Panel 1
of Figure 4, with the quarter labeled 0 denoting the onset of a recession. The job destruction rate
goes up from 5.38% to 10.84% on impact. Thus, the immediate eﬀect of a negative demand shock
is to clear out some ﬁrms that would have stayed in had demand remained high. After 70 quarters,
the job destruction rate converges to 5.63%, still above its original value. Hence, the conventional
cleansing eﬀect of demand on job destruction that we establish analytically in steady state carries
over with probabilistic cycles.
Unlike the job destruction rate, the job creation rate drops from 4.69% to 4.32% when a recession
strikes, rises gradually and converges later. This matches the ﬁnding of Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) that the job creation rate falls during recessions and co-moves negatively with the job
destruction rate over the cycle.22
The analysis of the steady state also suggests that recessions will bring a scarring eﬀect by
shifting labor resources toward bad ﬁrms. As shown in Panel 2 of Figure 4, the fraction of labor at
good ﬁrms drops from 49.8% to 48.07% when the negative demand shock strikes and converges to
47.87% after 70 quarters. This implies that the negative demand shock shifts the cross-idiosyncratic
productivity ﬁrm distribution toward bad ﬁrms. Hence, the scarring eﬀect suggested by the steady-
state analysis also carries over with probabilistic business cycles.
Two remarks are in order regarding the response of the fraction of labor at good ﬁrms to a
negative demand shock. First, the initial drop in lg at the onset of a recession contradicts our
argument in Section 2 that the scarring eﬀect takes time to work. Our calibration exercises suggest
that this feature is robust and can be understood as follows. Recessions shift both exit margins
to younger ages. While the shift of the exit margin for unsure ﬁr m sc l e a r so u tboth bad ﬁrms and
good ﬁrms, the shift of the exit margin for good ﬁrms clears out only good ﬁrms, so that in total
more good ﬁrms are cleared out than bad ﬁrms initially and lg drops at the onset of a recession.
Since lg eventually converges to a value below the initial drop, and the initial drop in lg also stems
22Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) report a correlation coeﬃcient of −0.17 of job destruction and job creation for the
U.S. Manufacturing from 1947:1-1993:4.
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Figure 4: Response to a Negative Demand Shock: vin is the detrended average labor productivity
driven only by the cleansing eﬀect, prod is the detrended average labor productivity driven by
both the cleansing eﬀe c ta n dt h es c a r r i n ge ﬀect. Scar = prod − vin. The horizontal axis denotes
quarters, with the quarter labeled 0 denoting the onset of a recession.
22from learning, this result does not hurt our argument that in a model with learning, recessions
create a scarring eﬀect by shifting resources toward bad ﬁrms.
Second, the response of lg shown in Panel 2 is hump-shaped: it drops initially, increases grad-
ually, then declines again. This feature is mainly due to the response of the exit margins over the
cycle. When a recession ﬁrst strikes, the exit margins over-shift to the left, and shift back gradually
as the recession persists. As the exit margin for unsure ﬁr m ss h i f t sb a c k ,m o r eg o o dﬁrms are
allowed to reach their potential; meanwhile, as the exit margin for good ﬁr m ss h i f t sb a c k ,n oo l d
good ﬁrms exit for several quarters. Hence, lg increases after the initial drop. The exit margins
reach their stable points after about 20 quarters. From then on, lg starts to fall, with old good
ﬁrms gradually being cleared out but not enough new good ﬁrms being realized. Another part of
this hump-shaped response comes from the entry margin. Because they have had no time to learn,
newly entered cohorts have the least eﬃcient cross-idiosyncratic productivity ﬁrm distribution in
the industry, so that entry tends to drive down lg. When entry falls in a recession, the negative
impact of entry on lg is also reduced, which contributes to part of the increase in lg after the initial
drop.
To summarize, despite some transitory dynamics, Panel 1 and Panel 2 of Figure 4 suggest
that both the conventional cleansing eﬀect established in Proposition 1, and the scarring eﬀect
established in Proposition 3, carry over with probabilistic business cycles.
4.2.2 Implications for Productivity
Next, we turn to the quantitative implications of the model for the cyclical behavior of average labor
productivity. Let A represent the leading technology. With one worker per ﬁrm setup and ﬁrm-level
productivity given by A·θ
(1+γ)a, average labor productivity is aﬀected by A and the ﬁrm distribution
across a and θ. While technological progress drives A, and thus average labor productivity, to grow
at a trend rate γ (the technological pace), demand shocks add ﬂuctuations around this trend by
aﬀecting the labor distribution across a and θ.
To analyze the ﬂuctuations of average labor productivity over the cycle, we deﬁne de-trended
average labor productivity as the average of θ
(1+γ)a over heterogeneous ﬁrms. In evaluating this
measure, recall that there are two competing eﬀects. On the one hand, the cleansing eﬀect drives
down the average a by lowering the cut-oﬀ ages for each idiosyncratic productivity, causing average
labor productivity to rise. On the other hand, the scarring eﬀect drives down the average θ by
shifting resources away from good ﬁrms, causing average labor productivity to fall. To separate the
two eﬀects, we generate two indexes for average labor productivity. The ﬁrst index is the average
23of θ













This measure is aﬀected by both cleansing and scarring eﬀects. The other index is the average of
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This measure is aﬀected only by the cleansing eﬀect. To compare the relative magnitude of these
two eﬀects, their initial levels are both normalized as 1. Since only the cleansing eﬀect drives
the dynamics of vin but both cleansing and scarring eﬀects drive the dynamics of prod, the gap
between vin and prod reﬂects the magnitude of the scarring eﬀect. A scarring index measures this
gap. It is deﬁned as:
scar = prod − vin.
Panel 3 in Figure 4 traces the evolution of vin and prod in response to a negative demand
shock. As the negative demand shock strikes, the cleansing eﬀect alone raises the average labor
productivity to 1.013 while the scarring eﬀect brings the average labor productivity down to 0.9974.
After 70 quarters, prod converges to 0.9947 while vin converges to 1.0126. The dynamics of the
scarring index in response to a negative demand shock is plotted in Panel 4 of Figure 4. The scarring
index remains negative following a negative demand shock and eventually converges to −0.0179.
This matches the predictions of our model that the scarring eﬀect plays against the conventional
cleansing eﬀect during recessions by shifting resources away from good ﬁrms, driving down the
average labor productivity.
4.2.3 Simulation of U.S. Manufacturing Job Flows
To gauge whether the scarring eﬀect is likely to be relevant at business cycle frequencies, we simulate
our model’s response to random demand realizations generated by the model’s Markov chain. We
perform 1000 simulations of 87 quarters each. Results are presented in Table 2. The reported
statistics are means (standard deviations) based on 1000 simulated samples. Sample statistics for







Table 2: Means (std errors) of 1000 Simulated 87-quarter Samples: jd is the job destruction
rate, jc is the job creation rate, prod is detrended average labor productivity, q is detrended
aggregate output. Data comes from the U.S. Manufacturing job ﬂow series for 1972:2-1993:4,
compiled by Davis and Haltiwanger. *Detrended average labor productivity is calculated as output
per production worker, with output measured by industrial production index. The quarterly series
of industrial production index of U.S. manufacturing sector for 1972:2-1993:4 comes from the Federal
Reserve and the series of total production workers comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
of 1993 are included for comparison. In the table, jd and jc represent the job destruction and job
creation rate; prod and q represent de-trended average labor productivity and de-trended output.
Table 2 suggests that our calibrated model can replicate the observed patterns of job ﬂows;
moreover, the positive correlation coeﬃcient of 0.1221 between prod and q implies that our model
generates procyclical average labor productivity for the U.S. manufacturing sector in the relevant
period. Put diﬀerently, under our benchmark calibration the scarring eﬀect on cyclical productivity
dominates the cleansing eﬀect.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis of the Dominance of Scarring over Cleansing
In the baseline parameterization, we follow Caballero and Hammour (1994) in setting the quarterly
technological pace γ equal to 0.007. The value was estimated by attributing all output growth of
the U.S. manufacturing sector to technological progress, which may exaggerate the technological
pace in the relevant period. An alternative estimate of γ, has been provided by Basu, Fernald and
Shapiro (2001), who estimate TFP growth for diﬀerent industries in the U.S. from 1965 to 1996 after
controlling for employment growth, factor utilization, capital adjustment costs, quality of inputs and
deviations from constant returns and perfect competition. They estimate a quarterly technological
pace of 0.0037 for durable manufacturing, a pace of 0.0027 for non-durable manufacturing and an
even slower pace for other sectors.
How would a slow pace of technological progress aﬀect the magnitudes of the scarring and
cleansing eﬀects? To address this question, we re-calibrate our model assuming γ =0 .003,m a t c h -
ing the same moments of job creation and destruction as before, and simulate responses to a neg-
ative demand shock. The results are presented in Table 3 together with results from the baseline
25Calibration Results γ =0 .003 γ =0 .007
calibrated p 0.0830 0.0800
calibrated ϕ 0.1200 0.1420
Response to a Negative
Demand Shock
vin (when a recession strikes) 1.0052 1.0130
vin (70 quarters after a reces-
sion strikes)
1.0029 1.0126
prod (when a recession strikes) 0.9866 0.9974
prod (70 quarters after a reces-
sion strikes)
0.9820 0.9947
scar (when a recession strikes) −0.0186 −0.0156
scar (70 quarters after a reces-
sion strikes)
−0.0209 −0.0179
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis to a Slower Technological Pace (I): prod is detrended average labor
productivity, driven by both the cleansing and the scarring eﬀects, vin is the component of de-
trended average labor productivity driven only by the cleansing eﬀect, scar = prod - vin. Other
parameter values are as shown in Table 2.
parameterization.
The calibration results in Table 3 suggest that the model with γ =0 .003 needs a faster learning
pace (p =0 .083 compared to 0.08) and a smaller prior probability of ﬁrms’ being good (ϕ =0 .120
compared to 0.142) to match the observed moments of job ﬂows.23 The simulated responses suggest
that slower technological progress magniﬁes the scarring eﬀect, weakens the cleansing eﬀect, and
magniﬁes the procyclical behavior of productivity.
This result can be explained as follows. First, slower technological progress implies that the
force of creative destruction is weak. A lower γ weakens the technical disadvantage of old ﬁrms
a n da l l o w sb o t hg o o dﬁrms and unsure ﬁrms to live longer, so that less job destruction occurs at
t h ee x i tm a r g i n s .Al o w e rγ also implies a smaller cleansing eﬀect on average labor productivity.
A recession clears out marginal ﬁrms by shifting the exit margins toward younger ages. The size
of the shift is pinned down in our calibration exercises by matching jdmax ≈ 11.6%.G i v e n t h e
shift of exit margins, a slower technological pace shrinks the productivity diﬀerence between the
23Consider (8), the expression of jd
ss for intuition. My calibration exercises look for parameter values that satisfy
three moment conditions on job ﬂows, one of which is that jd
ss ≈ 5.6%. Proposition 3 establishes that jd
ss decreases
with the exit ages (ag and au). It can be further shown that it increases in p but decreases in ϕ. A slower technological
pace weakens the technical disadvantage of old ﬁrms and extends their life span so that both ag and au tend to increase.
Hence, the job destruction rate would decrease if p and ϕ remain the same. A faster learning pace and a lower prior
probability of being good are thus needed to match the observed mean job destruction. Thus, the paramerization of
my model with γ =0 .003 suggests that more job destruction comes from learning rather than creative destruction.
26simulation statistics
with γ =0 .003
simulation statistics
with γ =0 .007
data
jdmean 5.60%(0.0534%) 5.21%(0.0593%) 5.6%
jdstd 1.23%(0.0996%) 1.34%(0.1100%) 1.66%
jcmean 5.25%(0.0171%) 4.83%(0.0158%) 5.19%
jcstd 0.26%(0.0059%) 0.24%(0.0055%) 0.95%
corr(prod,q) 0.6563(0.1599) 0.1221(0.2131) 0.5537
Table 4: Sensitivity to A Slower Technological Pace (II): Means (std errors) of 1000 Simulated
87-quarter Samples. Deﬁnitions, measures and data sources are the same as Table 4.
vintages that have been killed and the ones that have survived, so that the impact of the cleansing
eﬀect on average labor productivity declines.
Second, when we assume a lower γ, we must also assume a higher p and a lower ϕ to match the
moments of job destruction. This re-calibration implies a larger role for learning in job destruction:
ﬁrms not only learn faster, but are more likely to learn that they are bad. This also gives a larger
scarring eﬀect on average labor productivity: a faster learning pace implies a higher opportunity
cost of not allowing unsure ﬁrms to survive; a smaller prior probability of being good suggests that
learning has a greater marginal impact on cross-section eﬃciency.
Table 4 reports the simulation statistics of 1000 simulated 87-quarter samples when γ =0 .003.
Results when γ =0 .007 and sample statistics from data are included for comparison. Our model
with γ =0 .003 generates a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.4819 between detrended average labor pro-
ductivity and detrended output. Productivity is strongly procyclical, almost as much as in the
data.
5C o n c l u s i o n
How do recessions aﬀect resource allocation? This paper suggests that ﬁrm learning has important
consequences for this question. We posit that, in addition to the cleansing eﬀect proposed by
previous authors, recessions create a scarring eﬀect by interrupting the learning process. Recessions
kill oﬀ potentially good ﬁrms, truncate the learning process that reallocates resources into good
ﬁrms, and exacerbate the allocative ineﬃciency in an industry. The empirical relevance of the
scarring eﬀect is examined in Section 4. Using data on U.S. manufacturing job ﬂows, we ﬁnd that
the scarring eﬀect dominates the cleansing eﬀect in the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1972 to
1993, and can account for the observed degree of procyclical productivity.
Firm size can be introduced to the current model without modifying the basic results. If ﬁrms
are allowed to choose their employment levels, both vintage and expected idiosyncratic productivity
27would aﬀect a ﬁrm’s size positively: holding belief constant, younger ﬁrms hire more labor; holding
vintage constant, good ﬁrms are bigger. This modiﬁcation will not change our results qualitatively
or quantitatively.24 Rather, it gives rise to some interesting new predictions. With good ﬁrms
bigger than unsure ﬁrms, a ﬁrm would increase its employment once it learns itself as good, so that
an additional job creation margin arises from learning. Then the exit of potentially good ﬁrms
during recessions would also reduce later job creation driven by learning. This is consistent with
the argument by Caballero and Hammour (2004) that spikes in job destruction during recessions
i nt h eU Sm a n u f a c t u r i n gs e c t o ra r eu s u a l l yf o l l o w e db ys l u g g i s hj o bc r e a t i o nd u r i n gt h er e c o v e r y
phase of the cyclical downturn.
Finally, the empirical relevance of the scarring eﬀect remains to be explored in a wider frame-
work. Our calibration exercises have focused on the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1972 to 1993,
where job destruction is documented more responsive to business cycles than job creation. However,
Foote (1997) documents that in services, ﬁre, transportation and communications, retail trade, and
wholesale trade, job creation is more volatile than job destruction. Moreover, Hall (2005) suggests
that the recession of 2001 is dominated by sluggish creation rather than increased destruction.
Notice that, in Caballero and Hammour (1994) and in our model, the creation margin and the
destruction margin accommodate demand variations together. More responsive creation can be
generated with entry cost adjusted less sensible to entry size. The question then becomes, would
relatively more responsive job creation hurt the dominance of the scarring eﬀect? It could, since
recessions leave “scars” by killing oﬀ potentially good ﬁrms on the destruction side. It may not,
because a larger decline in job creation also introduces fewer potentially good ﬁrms on the cre-
ation side. Whether “scarring” dominates “cleansing” in sectors other than manufacturing, or in a
recession characterized by sluggish creation, remains an interesting question.
24This is an earlier version of the model. Allowing for ﬁrm size does not change my results qualitatively. As seen
in Figure 3, as long as recessions reduce price, the exit margins will shift to younger ages, so that there is a cleansing
eﬀect with younger average vintage, and a scarring eﬀect with good ﬁrms in the shaded area disappearing. These
happen regardless of ﬁrm size. Neither will the quantitative results be aﬀected. With bigger good ﬁrms, the industrial
proportion of labor at good ﬁrms is generally higher than the one in the current model, so that the decline in this
proportion brought by recessions (the scarring eﬀect) has a smaller marginal eﬀect on productivity. However, the
average per-labor vintage would also be higher since ﬁrms with better vintages are bigger, so that the increase in
average vintage brought by recessions (the cleansing eﬀect) also has a smaller marginal eﬀect on productivity. It
turns out that the scarring eﬀect still dominates the cleansing eﬀect in the calibration exercises. The version of the
model with ﬁrms diﬀering in size is available upon request.
286A p p e n d i x
6.1 Approximating Value Functions with Krusell & Smith (1998) Approach
The key computational task is to map F,t h eﬁrm distribution across ages and idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, given demand level D, into a set of value functions V (θe,a;F,D). To make the state






(1 + γ)−a · θe · f (θe,a).( 1 0 )
Combining (9) with (6) and (7), we get




A is the leading technology; F0 is the updated ﬁrm distribution after entry and exit; X0 cor-
responds to F0; P (F,D) is the equilibrium price in a period with initial aggregate state (F,D).
Since F0 = H(F,D), the above equation can be re-written as
P (F,D) · A =
D
X (H (F,D))
Given these deﬁnitions, the single-period proﬁtability of a ﬁrm of idiosyncratic productivity θe and




· (1 + γ)−a · (θ + ε) − 1. (11)
Thus, the aggregate state (F,D) and its law of motion help ﬁrms to predict future proﬁtability
by suggesting sequences of X’s from today onward under diﬀerent paths of demand realizations.
The question then is: what is the ﬁrm’s critical level of knowledge of F that allows it to predict
the sequence of X0s over time? Although ﬁrms would ideally have full information about F,t h i si s
not computationally feasible. Therefore we need to ﬁnd an information set Ω that delivers a good
approximation of ﬁrms’ equilibrium behavior, yet is small enough to reduce the computational
diﬃculty.
I look for an Ω through the following procedure. In step 1, we choose a candidate Ω. In step 2,
we postulate perceived laws of motion for all members of Ω, denoted HΩ, such that Ω0 = HΩ (Ω,D).
In step 3, given HΩ, we calculate ﬁrms’ value functions on a grid of points in the state space of Ω
applying value function iteration, and obtain the corresponding industry-level decision rules — entry
sizes and exit ages across aggregate states. In step 4, given such decision rules and an initial ﬁrm
distribution. We simulate the behavior of a continuum of ﬁrms along a random path of demand
realizations, and derive the implied aggregate behavior – a time series of Ω. In step 5, we use the
stationary region of the simulated series to estimate the implied laws of motion and compare them
with the perceived HΩ;i fd i ﬀerent, we update HΩ, return to step 3 and continue until convergence.
In step 6, once HΩ c o n v e r g e s ,w ee v a l u a t et h eﬁto fHΩ in terms of tracking the aggregate behavior.
29Ω {X}
HΩ
Hx(X,Dh):logX0 =1 .2669 + 0.8532logX
Hx (X,Dl):logX0 =2 .4234 + 0.7175logX












Table 5: The Estimated Laws of Motion and Measures of Fit
If the ﬁt is satisfactory, we stop; if not, we return to step 1, make ﬁrms more knowledgeable by
expanding Ω, and repeat the procedure.
I start with Ω = {X} – ﬁrms observe X instead of F. We further assume that ﬁrms perceive
the sequence of future coming X0s as depending on nothing more than the current observed X and
the state of demand. The perceived law of motion for X is denoted Hx so that X0 = Hx (X,D).
We then apply the procedure described above and simulate the behavior of a continuum of ﬁrms
over 5000 periods. The results are presented in Table 5.
As shown in Table 5, the estimated Hx is log-linear. The ﬁto fHx is quite good, as suggested
by the high R2, the low standard forecast error, and the low maximum forecast error. The good ﬁt
when Ω = {X} implies that ﬁrms perceiving these simple laws of motion make only small mistakes
in forecasting future prices. To explore the extent to which the forecast error can be explained
by variables other than X, we implement the Den Haan and Marcet (1994) test using instruments
[1,X,μ a,σa,γa,κ a,r u],w h e r eμa, σa, γa, κa,ru are the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and
kurtosis of the age distribution of ﬁrms, and the fraction of unsure ﬁrms, respectively. The test
statistic is 0.8007, well below the critical value at the 1% level. This suggests that given the
estimated laws of motion, we do not ﬁnd much additional forecasting power contained in other
variables. Nevertheless, we expand Ω further to include σa, the standard deviation of the age
distribution of ﬁrms. The results when Ω = {X,σa} are shown in Table 6.
Apparently, the measures of ﬁt do not change much. Furthermore, the impact of changes in σa
on the approximated value function is very small (less than 0.5%). This conﬁrms that the inclusion
of information other than X improves the forecast accuracy by only a very small amount.
Figure 5 displays the value of staying for heterogeneous ﬁrms as a function of a, θe, D and
X (logX). Figure 6 displays the corresponding optimal exit ages and entry sizes. These tables
and ﬁgures suggest that our solution using X to approximate the aggregate state closely replicates
optimal ﬁrm behavior at the equilibrium. These results were robust when we experimented with
diﬀerent parameterization of the model. Therefore, we use the solution based on Ω = {X} to




logX0 =0 .1261 + 0.9653logX +0 .3246σa
recessions(logX):
σ0
a =0 .0079 + 0.0076logX +0 .8988σa
booms (σa):
logX0 = −0.1485 + 0.9291logX +1 .0317σa
recessions(σa):
σ0


























Table 6: The Estimated Laws of Motion with two moments and Measures of Fit
31Figure 5: Expected Value of Staying: aggregate state variables are D and logX (the log of detrended
output), ﬁrm-level state variables are ﬁrm age and belief (good or unsure); the parameter choices



























of good firms in booms 
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in booms 
in recessions 
Figure 6: Industry-level Policy Functions: Entry Size and Exit Ages. Aggregate states are D
(booms or recessions) and logX (the log of detrended output).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. According to the condition of competitive pricing and the deﬁnition of a steady state,













with D as the time-invariant demand, f (θe,a) the time-invariant number of ﬁrms with (θe,a),a n d
ag, au the time-invariant exit ages for good and unsure ﬁrms. It suggests that PtAt must also be
time-invariant. We let PtAt = PA.
f (0) represents the time-invariant entry size at the steady state. Let V (θe,a) be the time-
invariant expected value of staying of a ﬁrm with belief θe and age a. The exit condition for good
ﬁrms, V (θg,ag)=0 , suggests:
θgPA(1 + γ)
−ag − 1=0 . (11)
With f (θe,a) given by all-or-nothing learning, (10) and (11) together with the steady-state struc-



















































λ(θg,a)=C (f (0)). (13)
λ(θu,a) and λ(θg,a) are the probabilities of staying in operation at age a as an unsure ﬁrm and
a good ﬁrm, and are given by the all-or-nothing learning.
























(1 − β)(1+γ − β)
βag−au.( 1 5 )
(15) solves ag−au. To establish the existence and the uniqueness of the solution, let F (ag − au)
represents the left-hand side, and G(ag − au) the right-hand side of (15). It can be shown that
G0 > 0 but G00 < 0, F0 > 0 and F00 > 0;m o r e o v e r ,




Since θu <θ g holds by deﬁnition, F and G must cross once at a positive value of ag −au,a ss h o w n
34in the following ﬁgure
aa gu − 0
( ) Fa a gu −
() Ga a gu −
() F 0
() G 0
aa gu − 0
( ) Fa a gu −
() Ga a gu −
() F 0
() G 0
Hence, (15) determines a unique value for ag−au. With the value of au = ag−(ag−au) plugged
in, (12) and (13) jointly determine f(0) and ag when C0 > 0.
Notice that with entry cost independent of entry size, C0 =0 . (15), (12) and (13) become
recursive. (15) determines ag − au.W i t h au = ag − (ag − au), (13) determines ag.T h e n ( 1 2 )
determines f(0).S i n c eD is only present in (12), variations in D would be exclusively accommodated
by variations in f(0).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2:
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The left-hand monotonically increases in ag.H e n c e ,
d(ag)












356.4 Proof of Proposition 3:









Proposition 3 has established that
d(au)
d(D) ≥ 0.T h e r e f o r e ,
d(rg)














d(au) ≥ 0 i fa n do n l yi f
d(x)
d(au) ≥ 0.
Hence, we need to prove that
d(x)
d(au) ≥ 0.
1 − (1 − p)
au is plotted in the following graph as a function of au.S i n c e
d
³




= −(1 − p)








2 = −(1 − p)
au · (ln(1 − p))
2 < 0,
the curve is concave.
au




11 −− () p
au
au




11 −− () p
au
Clearly, it indicates that x = au
1−(1−p)au =c o t( θ).The concavity of the curve suggests that as
au increases, the angle of θ shrinks and cot(θ) increases. Therefore, x increases in au.
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